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The complexity of morphogenesis 
- Changes in the semantics of help and solidarity 
 
Maria Appel Nissen 
 
In Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft Niklas Luhmann argues that, no other 
theory has been able to explain the building and reproduction of the struc-
tures of society, and he points out that an essential theoretical problem is 
the morphogenesis of complexity (Luhmann 1997:413, 415), meaning how 
society changes its own form of complexity. His solution to the problem is 
a theory of evolution based on the premise that evolution and the repro-
duction of society must be explained by a paradox: complexity is what makes 
society both improbable and probable (Luhmann 1997:451). From this paradox 
Luhmann describes how society communicatively, selectively and through 
changing modes of self-describtion has reformed unsolvable problems of 
complexity into operative solutions, rebuilding its own structures and 
‘against all odds’ has reproduced and made itself possible. This describ-
tion is closely coupled to the concept of functional differentiation as a 
meaningful conceptualization of how modern society organizes itself and 
best can be described. One can say that the concept of functional differen-
tiation works as an ontological premise for the explanation of the building 
and reproduction of the structures of society. It is the theory and analysis 
of the emergence of functional differentiated society which makes the 
theoretical paradox stated probable.  
There is nothing controversial about this since this is how sci-
ence also works – making theoretical explanation probable through em-
pirical analysis. However, if to be critical, one can say that by paying em-
pirical attention to the probability of the paradox, Luhmann does not un-
fold it theoretically. We might say that the theoretical problem, which 
Luhmann to some degree leaves unsolved, is not the morphogenesis of 
complexity, but the complexity of morphogenesis. This it what this paper ex-
plores, and in this way it represent an attempt to raise some questions and 
lay out some possible directions for an elaboration of Luhmanns theory of 
evolution. In the paper, I will first discuss themes concerning evolution, 
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morphogenesis and differentiation and signs of change. A main point is that the 
question of the direction of evolution is a theoretical problem yet to be ex-
plored. This is done through an empirical example of changes in the seman-
tics of help and solidarity. At the end of the paper, I will outline some theo-
retical elaborations on the complexity of morphogenesis and the direction 
of evolution as well as some challenges for Luhmann’s sociology.  
The relevance of this theoretical exercise is perhaps not so ob-
vious as long as the concept of functional differentiation yet offers a plau-
sible way of conceptualizing the present. However being part of a society 
where temporal self-describtions and complexity leave us only with “the 
certainty of the uncertainty of the future”, one must ask whether there 
might be a time, when this is no longer the case not only due to “fashion-
able terms of postmodernity” (Luhmann 1991:287), but because society is 
already changing its mode of organization. What destiny will a theory of 
evolution so closely linked to the concept of functional differentiation then 
become? My point is that the theory of evolution must be developed with 
a higher sensitivity to social change, which seem to and do perhaps evolve 
without reference to already known structures.  
 
The theory of evolution and the direction of evolution 
The theory of evolution is a subsystem to the theory of functional differen-
tiation specifically dealing with the generative mechanisms of differentia-
tion. The theory seeks to explain how society has changed its form of 
complexity in terms of differentiation.  
The concept of evolution is a modern concept itself related to 
a scientific problem of understanding structural change (Moe 2003:264). It 
is a concept of time as well as a time concept. As a concept of time, Luhmann 
argues that the semantics of evolution have changed from the idea of pro-
gress, over the idea of social planning/social control to the problem of orienta-
tion (Luhmann 1991:287). He argues sociology has not yet responded ade-
quately to those changes and suggests the paradox of complexity as a 
theoretical basis for understanding how evolution is set forward. However 
this means that evolution - as a time concept - becomes complex too. For 
example Moe finds that Luhmann’s theory operates with three concepts of 
time - system time, world time and cosmological time - but has a problem of 
taking into account anything but system time, perhaps because of the ef-
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fort to avoid ontological obstacles when handling the problem that we are 
in time while trying to conceptualize it. The result is that time in a more 
generalized form becomes a precondition for the theory of evolution how-
ever only latently explored theoretically (Moe 2003:358). This is perhaps 
why Luhmann’s theory stresses how modern society operates in multiple 
time horizons; evolution is the operational construction of time dependent 
of the system observing. The theory of evolution stresses the epistemo-
logical and methodological problems of observing social change due to 
different time horizons, and is therefore well suited for describing and ex-
plaining present problems of synchronicity. 
However, one can ask what this operative constructivist ap-
proach to evolution leaves out? Haferkamp et al. (1991) suggest that any 
theory of change must contain three elements that must stand in definite 
relation to another: Structural determinants, processes and mechanisms, direc-
tions of social change. Luhmanns theory of evolution sees the problem of 
complexity as a structural determinant for processes and mechanisms of 
change, but the concept of complexity does not prescribe a certain selec-
tion of a system in time.  It is in this sense the question of the direction of 
social change – including what directs the direction of change – is to some 
degree left unsolved.  One can say that Luhmann reproduces the problem 
of orientation and the theoretical question of the direction of evolution.  
How is it possible then to explore theoretically the direction of 
evolution? Since Luhmann defines evolution as a synthesis of variation, 
selection and restabilization it seems a natural place to start. He clarifies 
the meaning of variation, selection and restabilization as follows: 
 
“(1) through variation the elements of systems is varied, including commu-
nication. Variation is the non conform reproduction of the elements 
through the elements of systems, in other words: unexpected unantici-
pated communication.  
 (2) Selection concerns the structures of systems in this case communication 
related to the primary expectations. From the variation of non conform 
communication at hand they select meaning which is promising in terms 
of rebuilding structure, is suitable for repetitive use, and effective in terms 
of forming and condensing expectations; and they disturb, because they 
include the non conformity of the situation, leave it to be forgotten or even 
explicitly deny it as changes which apparently are not suitable for struc-
ture – for guiding further communication. 
 (3) Restabilisiering concerns the state of evolving systems following either a 
positive or a negative selection. In this state it concerns first of all the sys-
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tem of society itself in relation to its environment …In the further process 
of the societal evolution the function of restabilization will increasingly be 
distributed to the subsystems of society which must maintain them selves 
in an inter-societal environment. In the end it concerns the problem of the 
durability of the differentiation of society (Luhmann 1997:454-455, my 
translation) 
 
This clarification also raises some questions. Even if systems, given (selec-
tion and restabilization of) their elements and in the face of complexity 
(variation) will select what they expect will contribute to the rebuilding of 
expectations, is it then always probable that their selected form of com-
munication will contribute to the restabilization of the system? Or is it 
possible that variation, in terms of unexpected communication and the 
tendency to select what seems to contribute to the rebuilding of expecta-
tions will at the same time lead to destabilization eventually destruction of 
the system? There is no absolute answer, but a question is: if complexity is 
what makes society both probable and improbable, what makes the differ-
ence between restabilization and destabilization (eventually destruction)? This 
question is not only of theoretical interest. The direction of evolution has 
to do with the (observation of) probability of restabilization (including the 
restabilization of a time horizon). Since time is an element of meaning, 
since communication operates in meaning, and since society is produced 
communicatively on the basis of meaning, the structuring of time is an es-
sential aspect of integration as the capacity to enforce more stabile expec-
tations of expectation. A more elaborated understanding of the difference 
between restabilization and destabilization will perhaps make society 
more capable of distinguishing between when integration is at risk or not. 
 
Reflections on morphogenesis 
For a theoretical elaboration I suggest we look further into the concept of 
morphogenesis. Morphogenesis does not refer to the difference between 
system/environment but to the difference between possible/impossible; it 
is the operative potentiality or the question of probability (Moe 2003:235).  
Luhmann defines morphogenetic processes as specific forms 
of evolution developing on an uncoordinated or “open terrain” (Luhmann 
2000:410), in opposition to processes developing on the basis of coordi-
nated selectivity. Furthermore they: 
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”…only handle the increase in selectivity one-sidedly. They connect one 
structural change to another without orienting themselves by anticipation 
of or retrospection on the results. In this way, they accumulate improb-
abilities without including them as a meaningful result in the process. 
They remain dependent of “chance”, an uncoordinated interplay of selec-
tion and variation” (Luhmann 2000: 414, my translation) 
 
One can also say that morphogenetic processes takes place within a sys-
tem generating a rigid self-referential orientation based on a non reflexive 
communication and therefore not coordinated reaction to systems in its 
environment including its own (inter)actions. If not being able to reflect, 
the system will become ‘out of sync’ or ‘out of time’. It will base its selec-
tions on contrafactual variation and will react inadequately.  
In relation to evolution the concept of morphogenesis speci-
fies the generative mechanisms of evolution. It indicates that evolution is 
not just dependent on system relative selections. Evolution is also depend-
ent on the degree of interdependence and integration. In this perspective 
the concept of morphogenesis is a time concept addressing the question of 
restabilization/destabilization. It indicates a specific process among other 
processes specifically related to the rebuilding of systems which “tend to-
ward unanticipated phases of development, towards stagnation and to-
wards destruction” (Luhmann 2000:415) One can say that morfogenesis is 
the distinction between restabilization/destabilization. But what generates 
the generative processes of morfogenesis? For such an exploration of the com-
plexity of morphogenesis, I suggest we offer attention to what it means, 
that “the function of restabilization will increasingly be distributed to the 
subsystems of society” (cf. quotation p. 4) 
 
Differentiation and signs of change 
Theoretically the distinction between restabilization/destabilization must 
work independent of the concrete mode of differentiation. We can assume 
that destabilizing structures are structures ‘competitive’ or functionally 
equivalent to structures restabilizing the primary differentiation of society. 
One might call these structures latent structures of society; structures yet 
to be unfolded. If the function of restabilization increasingly is distributed 
to the subsystems of society, one can assume that this is where signs of re-
stabilization/destabilization can be observed. And perhaps we can specify 
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our focus a bit more by building on Luhmanns distinction between inter-
action and society. 
Luhmann describes interactions as “episodes in the societal 
process” but also as the “hydraulic” of society (Luhmann 2000:469, 479). 
Changes in modes of interaction are the generative precondition for dif-
ferentiation in an evolutionary sense. Therefore the “differentiation of the 
economy is a consequence of the use of money; the differentiation of poli-
tics a consequence of the use of power” etc. and the precondition for this is 
that “a sufficiently effective semantics has become available by means of 
which one can distinguish between the use of money and the use of 
power” (Luhmann 1998:6). Following this we can assume that it is within 
the difference between organization/interaction that signs of restabiliza-
tion/destabilization can be observed as the differentiation of functional 
equivalent semantics. 
 In relation to contemporary morphorgenetic processes func-
tional equivalent semantics is on the one hand semantics related to func-
tional differentiation which does no longer sufficiently guide selections; on 
the other hand semantics indicating a future not yet realised form of com-
plexity and mode of integration testing the “durability of differentiation of 
society” (cf. quotation p. 4). It is in this sense the complexity of morphoge-
netic processes is related to a question of integration. However, what are 
these semantics not only in functionally differentiated society but in any society? 
Luhmann defines morphorgenetic processes as processes of change taking 
place on an unknown ground (Luhmann 2000:416). At this stage, so does 
this paper.  
  
Changes in the semantics of help and solidarity 
The semantics of restabilization and destabilization can be concretized if 
we explore changes in semantics of solidarity and help because they are 
related to how society respond to the effects of its integration.  
In Hagens terminology solidarity is a medium enforcing col-
lective rationality which is reproduced communicatively through a system 
of collective action (Hagen 1999). According to Hagen, societies have in 
various forms developed systems of collective action, which communica-
tively generates expectations of expectations. As a system of collective ac-
tion it observes various problems that no single system can deal with, be-
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cause the solution is dependent on interdependence and the capacity to 
make binding decisions. If there was no such system, there would be no 
society. In terms of differentiation Hagen sees the welfare state and the 
politics of the welfare state as a precondition for integration in modern so-
ciety. He describes the welfare state as a complex form of realization of 
solidarity working as a reflection system for and contributing to social in-
tegration primarily by the integration of state and market economy, sec-
ondly by the coordination of actions in relation to specific areas of per-
formance on an organizational level.  
The specific part of the welfare state guided by social policy 
performing in relation to social problems of exclusion can be seen as a re-
flection system for solidarity, marking the scope and limits of integration 
(Nissen 2005). The system of social help, as described by Baecker (1994), is 
thus reflecting society’s capacity to handle problems of integration as they 
are specifically manifested in problems of exclusion. Therefore one can as-
sume that changes within the use of semantics of help and solidarity are 
exposing semantics of restabilization and destabilization closely linked to 
the reproduction of society.  
 
Sceptic semantics of the risk of ineffectiveness 
The following example represents a certain elaboration of an in depth 
functional analysis of two organizations functionally related to the system 
of social help (Nissen 2005).1 The organizations are performing observa-
tion and treatment of families, in cases where the authorities – the case-
workers - are worried that the development of the child is at risk. On be-
half of the authorities the organizations work out reports on the function-
ality of the family, the ability of the parents to provide care, and the wel-
fare of the child. The reports are guiding the caseworker’s decision. The 
problem is often lack of knowledge whether it is best for the child to be 
placed in foster care/institution or if it is better that the child stay by the 
parents. 
The organizations perform within an area of social policy, 
which during the last 10 years have been subject to intense debate. The 
                                                 
1
 The analysis was based on a qualitative study performed during 6 months including participant 
observation, different forms of interviews and the analysis of documents such as social records and 
reports. 
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cost, numbers of and range of preventive measurements have increase but 
have not led to a decrease in placements. Research has placed doubt on 
the effects of placements, and has pointed out several problems in the way 
caseworkers make judgements about children. The search for knowledge 
about the effects of social work and the search for best practice has been 
intensified and institutionalized. The demand for documentation and evi-
dence based social work too. All in all it seems there is an increased scepti-
cism towards the use of help and an awareness of the risk of (cost) ineffec-
tiveness (Nissen 2007). Both organizations pay an obligation to a collective 
semantic about the rationality in helping families and children at risk 
however; they also observe this sceptic semantic of the risk of (cost) inef-
fectiveness.  
Organization A acknowledges that society produces social ine-
qualities which help cannot compensate for in longer run. It is reflected 
that “being at an institution is not meaningless, but it might not mean that 
much”. As a minimum, the organization tries to ensure that at least the 
child does not suffer from being included into the programme of the or-
ganization. To avoid this and to compensate for the potential lack of effi-
ciency, the professionals strive to base their treatment on facts rather than 
“fantasy”. The subjective values of social workers must be controlled to 
prevent judgements based on insufficient knowledge. Therefore observa-
tions are documented and the professional decision processes follow stan-
dardized procedures. In this way the idea of evidence based social work is 
reproduced in a local form. This semantic of help generates its own prob-
lems. Sometimes it is not possible to provide documentation that makes a 
certain treatment evident. Sometimes parents react in an unexpected way. 
Sometimes it is not so easy to get objective knowledge about the child. To 
organization A such incidents of disappointment are difficult to handle. 
The effort to control and provide documentation is enforced leading to a 
rigid self-referential process of selection, where it becomes more and more 
difficult to see, how help is possible. This process is characterized by the 
production of negative expectations to positive change on the behalf of the 
parents, a reduction in help offered, a production of contrafactual observa-
tions based on assumed risks, and the use of force. At last but not the least 
this process produces a semantic of the “meaninglessness of help” ex-
plained by the lack of solidarity of the parents. 
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Organization B represents a second order observation of the 
problems of Organization A. It is acknowledged that certain systems of 
help are ineffective. Fear of risks and making mistakes makes such sys-
tems act rigid and force help into a negative process where the primary 
purpose becomes the systems need for control rather than what is best for 
the family and the child. They do not respond to the needs of the indi-
viduals. Therefore Organization B does not use standardized programmes. 
Instead it operates on the basis of a general ‘philosophy’ based on values. 
An important idea is that parents are competent individuals who have not 
yet acknowledged their competences and therefore must be helped to re-
discover and regain their parental responsibility. Help is help to self-help. 
The organization does not spend time on documentation. The treatment is 
based on the individual professional “style” and ability to act and reflect 
“directly” in interaction in a personalized way. Therefore the direction of 
the treatment becomes a question of personal preferences. This semantic of 
help also generates some problems. The individualization of the treatment 
generates a variation of time-horizons, and it becomes difficult to generate 
expectations of expectations and to coordinate actions. For example what 
is communicated in present as a social expectation yet to be realized can 
sometimes at almost the same time be communicated as a social expecta-
tion not longer realizable, depending on who observes. When such erup-
tions in time occur the treatment becomes extremely coincidental due to 
lack of syncronicity and a general sense of time. In the end it becomes dif-
ficult to act and reflect “directly” in interaction, because the individual 
professional does not know if their actions are coherent with the expecta-
tions of the environment. Among the professionals it creates a sense of 
taking part in an uncontrolled “social experiment”. 
 
The complexity of morphogenesis 
The example indicates that the sceptic semantic of the risk of ineffective-
ness is a precondition for morphogenetic processes. It confronts a primary 
semantic of help systems as systems capable of helping, and sets forward 
processes where help as an act of solidarity becomes more improbable 
than probable.  
 It is important to understand that the sceptic semantic of inef-
fectiveness does not prescribe a certain selection. Neither does it prescribe 
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whether the selection will lead to restabilization or destabilization eventu-
ally destruction. However being a semantic confronting the effectiveness 
of a system, it is probable that it occurs in a society where the effectiveness 
of systems has been probable but is no longer evident.  
At present this is the effectiveness of functional differentia-
tion. Being systems of help reflecting social policy and the scope and limits 
of solidarity, the operations of the organizations demonstrate the integra-
tion capacity within such a form of society. On one level this is related to 
problems of solidarity and the political response to this. Hagen sees New 
Public Management, as a political theory based on the assumption that 
welfare state organizations and professionals are most likely to be (cost) 
ineffective (Hagen 2006). On another level, the sceptic semantic of ineffec-
tiveness reflects problems of integration in functional differentiated soci-
ety. Functional differentiated societies have – given the effectiveness and 
autonomy of the function systems – problems of integration in terms of 
solidarity, and this can be observed as morphorgenetic processes in its 
performance systems latently enforcing the evolutionary improbability of 
integration. Here problems of integration are very concrete and related to 
the problem of dealing with problems of exclusion. As Luhmann says, the 
improbability of evolution and the risk of a certain form of differentiation 
becomes visible in the way society deals with problems of inclu-
sion/exclusion (Luhmann 1997:634). Much – including the ability to deal 
with problems of inclusion/exclusion - is dependent on society's capacity 
to reflect upon its own improbabilities.  A precondition to this is sensitiv-
ity to the question of the direction of evolution.  
 
The direction of evolution  
The example indicates that the direction of evolution can be reflected and 
explored through the observation of modes of reflection. Luhmann sug-
gest there is an evolutionary self-referential correlation between the ampli-
fication of uncertainty and differentiation, in the sense that uncertainty re-
quires a stronger effort to bind expectations of expectations, which in itself 
precipitate differentiation (Luhmann 2000: 358). It is exactly what the ex-
ample exemplifies. Organization A represents a second order reflection of 
help, reflecting the uncertainty of the effectiveness of help but still in belief 
that planning and control makes sense. Organization B represents a sec-
Paper for conference Niklas Luhmann’s Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft: Ten Years After.  
Luzern, December 6-8 2007. 
 
 
 
Maria Appel Nissen, Ph.D., Assistant professor, Aalborg University, 
Department of Sociology, Social Work and Organization, Kroghstræde 7, 9220 Aalborg, Denmark,  
Phone: + 45 96 35 72 92, e-mail: maan@socsci.aau.dk 
 
11 
ond order reflection of the semantics of Organization A, sceptic towards 
planning and control but with an inherent problem of orientation. The two 
organizations potentially represent eruptions or different modes of differ-
entiation and reflection in present time. At the time of the study, Organi-
zation B was already in a time of a certain kind of reflection, which Or-
ganization A had not yet reached. It is remarkable that by now Organiza-
tion A has developed a sceptisism towards planning and control and has 
turned into a more individualized and value based form of organization. 
This is according to Luhmann the “final reachable level for generating ex-
pectations of expectation”, because at this level one has refused the idea of 
coordination of actions, and can just refer to values as individually sym-
bolized preferences  (Luhmann 2000:372). It is perhaps even more remark-
able that Organization B does not exist any longer: “Changing everything 
at once amounts to destruction” (Luhmann 1976:149). 
Two points concerning the direction of evolution can be made 
from this.  First, the difference between restabilization and destabilization 
eventually destruction represents a higher separation through abstraction 
in the relation between organization and interaction. Secondly - and this is 
closer related to the direction of evolution in functionally differentiated 
society - individualization has reached a state, where the rebuilding of so-
cial structure is limited to the symbolic use of values – values which leaves 
a very open space for individualized ‘uncoordinated’ preferences. There-
fore we can assume that the direction of evolution is equal to the increased im-
probability of the organization. It indicates the limits of the capacity of the 
functional differentiated society to integration.  Luhmann expresses it like 
this: 
 
“… the modern type of differentiation, namely functional differentiation, 
is a highly improbable state with more negative aspects that either seg-
mentation or stratification. The new framework of temporal describtion 
emcompasses the old ones. Moreover, it also reevaluates them and pro-
vides conceptual space for including actual feelings of insecurity and risk, 
distrust in optimizing strategies and good intentions, an unavoidable 
alienation” (Luhmann 1991:290) 
 
One can also say that the mode of functional differentiation is no longer in 
a state where the positive side of a difference is marked semantically. In 
fact it is already basing its operations on the observation of the negative 
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aspects of its own operations and in this way reproduces a negation of it-
self putting an extreme pressure on the capacity of organizations. 
One can ask whether there are any alternatives to this destruc-
tion of functional differentiation. An alternative to the semantic of scep-
tisism could be a semantic of trust; however trust can only be an alterna-
tive in the longer run if reconfirmed in action (Luhmann 1999:59). There-
fore an alternative to sceptisism can only be modes of reflection that make 
it possible for society to build up expectations of expectations that guide 
actions. This will not make contemporary problems of integration disap-
pear; however it might ease the negative effects of periods of transforma-
tion. It is still an open question if Luhmanns theory of evolution has the 
capacity to contribute to such modes of reflections. Bringing the theory 
closer to the (empirical) probability of integration and solidarity as well as 
coordination of action within subsystems of society might be a help. 
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